LONDON POLICE SERVICE BOARD

Regular Meeting of the Board

OPEN SESSION AGENDA

Date	November 19th, 2026
Time	9:30 am for Motion to Move to Closed / **1:00 pm for Open Session**
Location	601 Dundas Street, Executive Boardroom | Livestream Link: 9:
Chair	Ryan Gauss

PART 1 LIVESTREAM LINK: 9:30 AM

PART 2 LIVESTREAM LINK: 1:00 PM

PART 1. OPENING *9:30 am for Motion to Move to Closed Session*

Call to Order	Chair
Motion to Move into Closed Session	Chair
THAT the Board move to a Closed meeting pursuant to Section 44(1)(b) and 44(2) of the Community Safety and Policing Act to discuss confidential labour relations, finance, and legal matters.	Motion

PART 2. OPEN SESSION *Reconvened at 1:00 pm*

#	Report No.	Item	Lead	Action
PROCEDURAL MATTERS				
1		**Reconvene in Open Session and Report from Closed**	Chair	
2		**Disclosures of Interest**	Chair	
3		**Approval of Minutes of October 15, 2026**	Chair	Motion

#	Report No.	Item	Lead	Action
4	**Consent Agenda**		Chair	Motion
	2611PB03	*Governance Updates and Correspondence*	*Chair*	
	2611EA01	*Investigation Pursuant to S. 81 of the CSPA*	*DC Bastien*	
	2611EA02	*Aggregate Disciplinary Measures Report*	*Chief*	
DELEGATION				
	Public Delegation		*Chair*	5 minutes
LEGISLATIVE COMPLIANCE				
5	2611PB01	Approval of the Board's **2027-2030 Strategic Plan for Policing in London** *Presentation by: Chair and CGO*	Chair	Decision
6	2611FF01	Courthouse Security Plan *Presentation by: Insp. Sean Susse, Administrative Support Branch*	DC MacSween	Information
GOVERNANCE AND OVERSIGHT				
7	2611PB02	Approval of the Board's **Governance Manual:** CSPA s. 46 Rules and Procedures of the Board	CGO	Decision
VERBAL UPDATES				
9		Verbal Updates › Chair Gauss › Chief	Chair	Information
10		**NEW BUSINESS**		
11		**MOTION TO ADJOURN**		

Accessibility: Agenda materials are available in alternate formats on request. Contact lpsb@lpsb.ca

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LONDON POLICE SERVICE BOARD OPEN REPORT

GOVERNANCE UPDATES & CORRESPONDENCE

Report Number	#2611PB03
Board Meeting Date	November 19, 2026

SUBMITTED BY

Stephanie Johanssen, LPSB Chief Governance Officer

REASON FOR REPORT

☑ **For Information/Update**

RECOMMENDATION(S)

This report is for information and update purposes only.

SUMMARY

The Board Office monitors sector correspondence, oversight developments and peer-board materials to identify emerging issues relevant to the Board's governance, assurance and policy responsibilities.

This report summarizes governance-related materials received since the Board's October 15, 2026 meeting, including from the Inspectorate of Policing, Police Governance Ontario (PGO), the Canadian Association of Police Governance (CAPG), and members of the public.

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

There are no direct financial implications.

DISCUSSION

1. CORRESPONDENCE

The following summarizes non-confidential correspondence and sector updates received since October 15, 2026.

Inspectorate of Policing

- **Adequate and effective policing:** The Inspector General published remarks on modern police oversight and the meaning of "adequate and effective policing." (Appendix A)
- **Integrity and Anti-Corruption Inspection:** The province-wide inspection, which includes police service boards, is ongoing. Progress updates are posted on the Inspectorate's website. Chief Truong will be providing a public update on the Service's response to the inspection at the December 2026 Board Meeting

Police Governance Ontario (PGO)

- **Post-election board transition:** PGO provided guidelines around the board transition following elections. Appointing authorities must consider a police record check prepared within the previous 12 months. New members must take the oath or affirmation and complete Module 1 of the mandatory training before performing board duties, including voting at meetings. Returning members who have completed the training do not need to repeat it.
- **AI & Police Governance Virtual Summit, November 25:** Six sessions on the board's role in governing police use of AI, including information requests, assurance, and responsible use. The Chief Governance Officer is a presenter.
- **Membership:** PGO circulated membership renewal messages highlighting zones, learning, advocacy, and plans for 2027.

Canadian Association of Police Governance (CAPG)

- **Webinars:** CAPG members receive discounted registration for its monthly webinar series.
  - **November 24, 2026:** Building a National Police Service: Ensuring Accountability with Capability
  - **February 9, 2027:** Crisis Communications
  - **February 25, 2027:** AI in Policing
  - **March 9, 2027:** Police Governance Under Fire: A Case Study in Saint John, New Brunswick
- **2027 Annual Conference:** CAPG's 38th Annual Conference will be held in Ottawa, August 11–13, 2027.
- **Member survey:** CAPG invited members to complete a short satisfaction survey to inform its next strategic plan.

Access to Information and Privacy

- **MFIPPA changes, effective January 1, 2027:** The Board Office is updating its access and privacy protocol to reflect the upcoming changes.

Public Correspondence

- **COAST continuity:** A community member submitted questions about COAST clinical capacity and continuity planning and requested it be in the November 19 correspondence package for the Board's consideration. The submission asks the Board to request and publish a report from the Chief, informed by COAST partners, on the program's clinical capacity, service continuity arrangements, implications for police deployment and resourcing, and a timetable for resolving outstanding commitments. Directing the Chief to produce a formal report of this nature would require a Board motion. This correspondence has also been directed to the Service. **(APPENDIX B)**
- **Neighbourhood safety (White Oaks):** Two residents raised broader community-safety concerns in the White Oaks neighbourhood. The Board Office acknowledged their correspondence, clarified the Board's role, and referred operational matters to the Service.
- **Transparency of external investigations:** A resident asked how public accountability is ensured when another police service, rather than the SIU, investigates an incident involving an officer. The resident also asked whether a Board policy review is warranted. The Board Office acknowledged the correspondence and that communication is ongoing.
- **Autism and police records:** A public-interest researcher comparing practices across Ontario police services asked whether LPS treats autism as an officer-safety concern and how autism and other disability-related information is recorded in police databases. Because the question concerns Service procedures, it was referred to the Office of the Chief. How disability-related information is collected and used is a matter the Board would consider as part of its wider policy framework, including human rights, accessibility and privacy.

Other

- **Policing Insight interview (APPENDIX C):** Policing Insight published an interview with the Chief Governance Officer of the London Police Service Board on the role of police boards in AI oversight.

Attachments/Appendixes

1. **Inspector General Statement on Adequate and Effective Policing**
2. **Public Correspondence RE Coast**
3. **Policing Insight Article**

***Alternative formats, translation, and communication supports for this report are available on request.**

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Inspectorate of Policing

“Beyond Compliance: Modern Oversight and the Evolution of Adequate and Effective Policing”

Keynote Address by Inspector General Ryan Teschner

Osgoode Professional Development Seminar

October 6, 2026

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

Good morning, everyone.

Thank you to Osgoode Professional Development, to our program chairs, Ian Bulmer and Maureen Salama, for the invitation to join you today. And thank you to all of you for being here. It is particularly nice for me to be back at Osgoode.

More than twenty years ago, I sat where many law students sit today, learning how legal frameworks are built, interpreted and applied. Earlier in my career, I also had the opportunity to contribute to policing policy and legislative reform efforts that ultimately helped shape the modernized policing and oversight framework that exists in Ontario today, under the Community Safety and Policing Act.

At the time, much of that work was necessarily conceptual. How should accountability function? What responsibilities should rest with police services, police boards, and oversight bodies? How do we create institutions capable of maintaining public confidence while adapting to changing expectations, new risks and an increasingly complex public safety environment?

Today, as Ontario's first Inspector General of Policing under the Community Safety and Policing Act, I have the privilege of seeing those questions from an entirely different perspective.

And, so, I would like to share some insights with all of you that I've gained not from the chair of a law student in the lecture hall, but from the chair of a first-of-its-kind oversight body in Canada.

Because writing the law is one thing. Watching it encounter and interact with the real world is something else entirely.

A legislative framework can look very orderly on paper. The real test begins when the first complaint comes through the door or the first inspection is launched. When a police service board asks what a new obligation means. When the first Decision has to apply a new statutory requirement to actual facts and withstand judicial scrutiny. Or, when the data suggests that what appears to be a local issue may actually be a province-wide pattern that needs to be addressed.

That is where Ontario finds itself today. Not in the blueprint stage anymore. The police oversight framework that was being created and growing, has now entered the real world, and is a real house, with real people in it, functioning in the community we serve.

The Community Safety and Policing Act has now been in force for approximately two and a half years. We have moved beyond implementation and into a much more consequential phase.

From framework to practice.

Today, I want to speak about what we are learning as that transition occurs. About how Ontario's modernized policing framework is operating in practice. About what the first Decisions, complaints, inspections, monitoring activities, research and data are telling

us. And about how independent oversight can help strengthen governance, improve performance and reinforce public confidence in policing.

You are going to spend the rest of today examining a number of specific policing issues, including body-worn cameras, suspensions, disclosure, less-lethal force, police defences and applicable administrative law principles and developments.

Those discussions are important.

But, I want us to step back and look at the broader framework that now connects many of these specific themes and issues. At the centre of that framework is a question that Ontario's policing sector is increasingly being asked to answer:

What does it mean to provide adequate and effective policing in Ontario?

Admittedly, this term — “adequate and effective policing” — was like the Polkaroo. It appeared, some people saw it for a moment, and then it disappeared and no one was the wiser or really saw its impact. People, even leaders in the policing sector, did not know what it meant. But, now, things are coming into focus.

The concept now includes a new generally applicable standard, built expressly around reasonableness and context. We have requirements that quantitative and qualitative information inform that assessment.

We also, under the CSPA and Adequacy and Effectiveness Regulation, have new governance, supervision and quality-assurance obligations.

And, for the first time, Ontario has an Inspector General of Policing with a mandate not only to inspect and issue Directions, but to monitor, advise, research, analyze, investigate complaints, and pro-actively identify risks across the policing system.

So the question is no longer simply: What does the statute say?

Increasingly, we need to ask: What does the standard mean in practice? How do we know when it is being met? What evidence should inform that assessment? What responsibilities sit with the police service boards, chiefs of police, and within policing organizations themselves to embed “adequacy and effectiveness” into governance and policing operational decision-making?

And importantly: What should modern oversight do when it sees risk developing – before that risk becomes a more significant concern?

Let me start with the environment in which all of this is happening. My assessment continues to be that Ontario has a fundamentally strong policing system. But strong systems can be under pressure. And some of the pressures we are seeing are not temporary.

Police organizations are responding to increasingly complex calls involving mental health, addictions, homelessness and vulnerability. They are also responding to increasingly complex public safety challenges, including hate-motivated incidents, public

order events that are larger and more sophisticated, forms of violent extremism, and increasingly complex criminal investigations.

These issues often require police services to draw on a range of statutory policing functions, including prevention, enforcement, public order maintenance, intelligence and community engagement. At the same time, there are continuing workforce, wellness, recruitment, retention and succession pressures across the sector.

Major public events are placing greater demands on specialized resources. Police service boards are being asked to exercise increasingly complex governance responsibilities in an environment where risks can emerge and evolve quickly.

And all of this is happening at a time when public expectations around transparency, accountability, performance and public confidence continue to rise.

Our province-wide public order inspection provides one concrete example. Between 2018 and 2022, Public Order Unit deployments in Ontario increased by 184 per cent. Our inspection found a system that was working generally well. Units were responding within reasonable timeframes and fulfilling their responsibilities.

But it also found a system showing signs of strain through increased demand, cost pressures, officer fatigue and recruitment challenges. That distinction matters.

Something does not need to be failing today for us to identify a risk to its sustainability tomorrow. And increasingly, that is where modern oversight can add value.

Not only by understanding where failures have occurred, but by identifying pressures, vulnerabilities and emerging risks before they become larger systemic issues.

I think that is one of the most important shifts in modern oversight.

Traditionally, oversight has often focused on determining whether there has been a failure to comply. That remains important.

But increasingly, we also need to ask: What are the conditions that could lead to non-compliance? Can we identify those conditions early enough to do something about them?

In many respects, that is what Ontario's modernized oversight framework is designed to do.

Our work at the Inspectorate of Policing over the past two years has reinforced that point and built the desire to answer that question into our DNA.

We continue to see variation in how police services and police service boards assess performance. The complaints we received have shown recurring concerns relating to service delivery, investigative quality and response times.

And as we collect more province-wide information through complaints, inspections, monitoring, advisory work, research and data analysis, we are increasingly able to

identify connections that may not be visible from the perspective of any single organization.

That matters because policing is increasingly interconnected.

A resource decision in one part of an organization can become a response-time issue. A response-time issue can become a public confidence issue. A technology procurement can engage training requirements, use-of-force considerations, governance responsibilities and legal risk simultaneously.

Increasingly, issues rarely exist in isolation.

We are also seeing the value of our real-time monitoring and advisory functions in identifying issues while they are still developing and supporting police chiefs and boards in navigating them well.

In some instances, our advisors become aware of emerging concerns through engagement with police services and boards before a formal issue manifests or a complaint is filed. That information may be reinforced by complaint trends, data analysis, research or other monitoring activities occurring across the province.

Traditional oversight models often engage reactively, after an issue has already occurred. Ontario's modernized oversight framework, and the philosophy I have tried to bring to my role as Inspector General, allows us to apply those traditional tools while also developing a more current understanding of emerging risks and pressures across the policing system.

Modern oversight has to be capable of seeing those pressures and risks as they develop, identifying issues early, understanding how they connect across the policing system, and responding before they become broader systemic concerns.

And that brings me to the role of the Inspector General. The mandate established under the Community Safety and Policing Act is unique. As Inspector General, I am responsible for overseeing both the delivery of policing and the governance of policing – and no oversight body in Ontario, and arguably in Canada, has that same dual role, overseeing both sides of the policing house.

That dual responsibility matters because policing performance and police governance are often discussed separately. But, in practice, they are interconnected.

Governance decisions can affect operational performance. Operational issues can raise governance questions and lead to governance decisions. And, both ultimately affect public confidence in policing.

That means the IoP’s work necessarily extends to police services, chiefs of police and police service boards.

We investigate complaints. We conduct inspections. We monitor compliance with the legislation and regulations. We provide advice and support. We conduct research and analysis. We collect and assess data. We publish Decisions. And where necessary, we

can issue binding Directions to address non-compliance by both police chiefs and boards.

What makes the model particularly significant is that these functions are connected. Complaints, inspections, monitoring, advisory activities, governance oversight, research and analytics are not separate exercises, or, to borrow a constitutional law phrase, “watertight compartments.”

They are different ways of understanding the complete system. And in my view, that is one of the most important features of the Inspector General’s statutory mandate.

But there is another aspect of the statutory framework that I believe is equally significant.

The mandate contains both a rearward-looking and a forward-looking dimension. Section 125 – the IG’s authority to issue binding directions – does not limit action to situations in which non-compliance has already occurred. The legislation also allows these binding directions to be issued where there is evidence that an entity is likely to fail to comply with its legal obligations.

Importantly, including from a public confidence perspective, the authority is not only about remedying non-compliance after the fact. It is also about preventing non-compliance from occurring in the first place.

It shows the Legislature explicitly contemplated risk, not just after-the-fact non-compliance. And that is an important signal about the type of oversight framework Ontario has chosen to create.

We are expected to assess what happened, but we are also expected to understand what is happening now. And that is why independent oversight must be capable of looking beyond individual incidents and understanding broader patterns across the policing system.

We are also given tools to understand what is happening now, and what may happen next.

The Inspector General is the statutory decision-maker, and the Inspectorate of Policing provides the operational capacity that supports that role through inspections, investigations, monitoring, advisory functions, research, analytics and data intelligence.

What makes the model particularly valuable is that those functions are not operating independently of one another. They provide different ways of understanding the same system.

A complaint may identify a recurring issue. Data may indicate that the same issue is appearing in multiple jurisdictions. Our advisors may be hearing similar concerns from police services or police service boards that suggest a systemic pattern.

Research may identify a broader trend or reveal that Ontario lacks a common approach to measuring or tackling the issue. That information can support additional monitoring. It

may lead to an inspection. And where non-compliance or risk of non-compliance is identified, it may ultimately result in a Direction.

When those functions are connected, we develop a more complete understanding of what is occurring across the policing system.

That is a very different model than one in which an oversight body first becomes involved only after a significant failure has already occurred.

It allows us to better understand emerging risks, identify patterns earlier, and support compliance and continuous improvement before larger issues develop.

And that takes me to something I have been speaking about more: collaborative oversight.

Independent oversight does not require distance from the realities of the system being overseen. In my view, effective oversight depends on understanding those realities.

We need to understand the operational environment in which police services and police service boards are functioning. We need to understand where legislative requirements are creating practical questions. We need to hear where boards and chiefs are seeing emerging pressures and challenges. And we need communities to tell us how policing is being experienced.

Put simply, oversight is more effective when it is informed, up close and personal, by those it oversees, and by those that consume our oversight.

Regulated entities should have clarity about expectations before, not only after, an issue becomes serious.

Collaboration provides context. And sometimes that context allows an issue to be addressed before it develops into a larger compliance concern. It can also appropriately, and without compromising independence, inform how to approach current or anticipated compliance issues.

I have often said that independent oversight should not be feared.

It should be understood as a mechanism for strengthening governance, improving performance and reinforcing public confidence.

That is also where our right-touch approach comes in.

Not every issue presents the same level of risk. Not every compliance concern calls for the same response. And not every opportunity for improvement needs to become a strict enforcement action.

The objective is not to use the strongest tool available. The objective is to use the appropriate tool for the issue before us.

So, with the backdrop of who we are, what this modern oversight framework in Ontario means, and my philosophy in applying it, we come to an important question: what does “adequate and effective policing” mean anyway?

Section 11 of the Community Safety and Policing Act identifies the policing functions that must be provided in accordance with provincial standards.

Regulation 392/23 – the “Adequate and Effective Policing” Regulation – then does something important.

Its new Generally Applicable Standard provides that a policing function must be delivered in a manner and to an extent that is reasonable, having regard to five codified factors:

- the policing needs of the community;
- local geographic and socio-demographic characteristics;
- how the function is effectively provided in similar Ontario communities;
- the service's own past effectiveness; and,
- best practices.

And the Regulation provides that consideration of those factors is to be informed by quantitative and qualitative information, to the extent that information is available.

I think there are a few important implications that flow from this new standard and how it has been interpreted and applied already. The first is that reasonableness is necessarily contextual.

Ontario is a large and diverse province. Communities deserve quality and responsive policing. Adequate and effective policing will not look identical in Toronto, Thunder Bay, Cobourg or a remote northern community.

I have often said that policing is not a one-size-fits-all enterprise. The particular needs of one community may not be the same as those of another. And in my view, that is the magic of democratic policing.

The second implication is that adequate and effective policing is not only about the moment of service delivery. When something breaks at the end of that chain, modern oversight should be capable of asking where the weakness actually sits. In other words, we need to understand not only what happened, but what contributed to it further up that chain.

And the third implication is that evidence matters. If the standard requires me to consider community need, comparative effectiveness, past performance and best practices, then we need information capable of supporting those assessments.

Evidence is not separate from the standard. It is part of how the standard is applied. And that is one of the reasons why data, research, performance measurement and analysis have become increasingly important components of modern policing oversight. We need real information to be considered as evidence in applying the legal standard I am required by law to apply.

What makes all of this particularly significant is that the Inspector General must ultimately determine whether a policing function hits the reasonable mark established by the legislation.

And, already and over time, these IG Decisions are creating precedent and guidance, and an emerging body of interpretation for the sector that did not previously exist.

These Decisions are helping actually define and concretize what adequate and effective policing and governance means in practice, and shaping how Ontario's modernized policing framework is understood and applied.

Nowhere is that movement more visible than in the Inspector General Decisions.

These Decisions represent some of the first interpretations and applications of the CSPA.

And because these Decisions have precedential value to inform future matters, their significance is not confined to the police service, police service board or complainant involved in a particular case.

When I released my first Decisions, I encouraged every police service and police service board in Ontario to establish a process for reviewing them and considering whether the principles being articulated had implications for their own operations, governance and performance.

That is part of how a new legislative framework develops. A statute provides the framework. Regulations provide greater specificity. Advisory guidance communicates expectations and interpretation. And, binding Decisions apply those requirements to real facts, real circumstances, and real choices being made by police services and boards.

Over time, they create guidance and a growing body of interpretation that did not previously exist for the sector.

Before I go further, I should offer one brief caveat.

As the statutory decision-maker, I need to be careful about saying too much about individual Decisions beyond what is already contained in the published reasons.

The Decisions speak for themselves.

Or, since I am among fellow lawyers, let me speak our language: res ipsa loquitur.

My purpose this morning is not to revisit individual matters. Rather, I want to step back and look at some of the areas where these early Decisions are beginning into breathe practical meaning to the CSPA.

And I see at least three themes.

Theme One: Reasonableness is assessed in context.

The Decision involving Waterloo Regional Police Service released on December 17, 2025 involved a complaint alleging that the Service had failed to take adequate enforcement action against illegal cannabis dispensaries.

My finding was compliance. The Decision recognized that Waterloo had not only met the applicable legal requirements, but demonstrated strong policing through its coordination with external partners, use of judicial authorizations and communication with the complainant.

There is also an important principle in that Decision with broader application. Adequate and effective policing is assessed using a reasonableness standard – and that standard, much like the reasonableness standard in the context of judicial review – asks whether the delivery of a policing function falls within a range of appropriate responses in context, rather than requiring perfection.

A Decision involving Hamilton Police Service released July 30, 2026 required the application of that standard in a very different context.

That complaint did not identify a particular incident. It raised concerns about the general approach to policing in Hamilton's downtown core since 2020, including alleged reduced patrol presence, increased violent crime and delays in answering and responding to 911 calls.

My finding was that Hamilton complied with the CSPA and its regulations and delivered policing services in a reasonable manner. The Decision considered information that was collected during the investigation concerning dedicated foot patrol resources, officer availability, violent-crime information, 911 call volumes and response times.

It also identified Hamilton's data-driven approach to resource deployment, crime prevention and community engagement, as well as the Board's role in establishing strategic priorities informed by public consultation.

These are very different factual circumstances. But, taken together, they demonstrate something important about applying the generally applicable standard: reasonableness is assessed in the relevant context, and that context is increasingly becoming information rich.

The CSPA does not require every community in Ontario to be policed in precisely the same way.

But it does give us a framework for assessing whether policing is being provided adequately and effectively and whether the approach taken is reasonable in the circumstances.

Theme Two: Adequate and Effective Policing Depends on the Systems That Support Its Delivery

A second theme emerges from Decisions where the complaint begins with a particular occurrence, but the investigation necessarily engages broader requirements surrounding the delivery of policing.

The Decision involving Niagara Regional Police Service and Board released on July 30, 2026 is an important example.

The complaint arose from a 911 cellular call. It alleged that officers were not dispatched after the call was received. The caller was found deceased several hours later.

The findings of non-compliance concerned the requirements for adequate and effective policing relating to call-taking and dispatch, as well as the implementation of a Quality Assurance Process by the police board and service.

The Directions went beyond the circumstances of that individual call. They required systemic changes to silent-call procedures, enhanced training, strengthened supervisory oversight, improvements to quality assurance policies and procedures, and ongoing reporting to me on implementation of my Directions.

Remember: a section 107 investigation is not an individual police conduct process.

Instead, our focus is the overall delivery of policing and governance and compliance with the CSPA and its regulations. So, an individual occurrence may be where the matter begins. But, the investigation may engage the procedures, training, supervision and quality assurance that surround the delivery of that policing function by that organization in a broader sense.

Put another way: a complaint allows us to zoom out, examine the system in which that policing function is delivered, and ultimately determine whether the system is healthy enough, or requires improvement in the performance of the service’s operational mandate, and board’s governance function.

The Decision involving Peel Regional Police Service released on December 27, 2025 engages some of those same broader considerations from a different direction.

Peel Regional Police had undertaken internal training and due diligence before authorizing officers to carry and use the PepperBall system.

Those efforts were acknowledged. But, no provincially prescribed training existed for the system, and, therefore, I found that the internal training did not meet the statutory requirements.

The finding was non-compliance, and the Direction required Peel to prohibit members from carrying or using the system until training was prescribed by law and completed. The province has since made changes to permit training approved by the chief of police, and the PepperBall system is now authorized for use. So, an example of a “feedback loop” that exists between my Decisions as IG, and government policy-making that can be responsive to these Decisions.

The Decision also addressed governance. Peel had not informed its Police Service Board about the procurement and deployment of the weapon.

In the Decision, I said that information about the acquisition and deployment of a new use of force option should be proactively shared with a board so that it has the visibility required to fulfil its governance role. After all, it is the board that is legally accountable for the service's operations, including potential litigation that could arise from those operations — including use of force incidents.

And I asked chiefs and boards across Ontario to take seriously the need for information to flow from day-to-day operations to police governance bodies.

So, when we talk about the delivery of adequate and effective policing, we are not talking only about the moment at which a policing service is delivered.

The Decisions are also engaging the requirements that surround it — training, procedure, supervision, quality assurance and governance.

And that brings me to the third theme.

Theme Three: Police Service Board Members Carry Distinct Statutory Duties and Obligations

The section 106 Decisions are beginning to interpret and apply the Code of Conduct for Police Service Board Members to the circumstances board members encounter in carrying out their roles. And, the different outcomes are important.

The Decision involving a Port Hope Police Service Board member released on August 27, 2026 involved allegations that the board member had engaged in conduct that placed his duties as a board member in conflict with his private employment interests.

After reviewing the Findings Report, I concluded that the member had committed misconduct under the Code of Conduct. The outcome was a six-month suspension without pay for breaches of sections 21(a) and 22 of the Code. And, importantly, this Decision interpreted the conflict of interest provisions of the Code of Conduct in a way that had not occurred to date, providing broader guidance and a trail of breadcrumbs for board members across the province to follow.

A Decision involving a Gananoque Police Service Board member released on December 17, 2025 involved a different kind of issue. That Decision addressed what has sometimes been described as the "two hats" issue for municipal officials who also serve on police service boards.

There, a board member who was also the mayor disclosed confidential information obtained during closed board meetings about the police response to a gathering of the Outlaws Motorcycle Club. Importantly, the information was obtained through his role as a police service board member, not through his role as mayor.

I found that he breached sections 4 and 15(1) of the Code by releasing information about policing operations without authorization.

In my Decision, I was clear that the responsibilities of mayor — or councillor — do not override the obligations that come with serving as a police service board member. In other words, mayoral or council office does not sit at the top of some kind of hierarchy of stator obligations relative to one's board member role.

Taken together, these Decisions reinforce a fairly important point about police governance. Serving on a police service board carries its own statutory duties and obligations. Those obligations do not disappear because a member also has another role — whether that is an elected municipal role or a private employment interest.

These Decisions are also beginning to provide greater clarity about how the obligations in the Code apply in practice. As additional matters are decided, that body of interpretation will continue to develop.

And, here I have some very specific words for this audience: for counsel advising boards, chiefs or individual board members, the growing body of Decisions will be increasingly important.

The Decisions are giving us greater clarity in each of those areas. They are also unpacking legal requirements in CSPA land, interpreting and applying them to different factual matrices, and, ultimately, providing legal conclusions that set precedent for the sector as a whole.

This, clearly, is where you as legal counsel to police chiefs, services, boards, and others, come in.

Now, Decisions are one significant component of my role and work.

However, if we want to understand how the policing system is performing more broadly — where pressures are developing, where strong performance exists, and whether something we are seeing in one place may reflect a broader issue — we need a wider field of view.

That is where data and research become increasingly important. The Inspectorate of Policing has now completed its first full cycle of data collection from municipal police services and boards.

We are building a policing data ecosystem, and this year launched our Intelligence Hub to make data and information more accessible and usable for police services and police service boards. This is part of a commitment we made at the beginning: that we will not simply ask and take. We will analyze, and share.

In addition, our Policing Performance Measurement Framework is being designed around a basic question that Ontario has never had a common, province-wide way of answering: How well are our police services and boards actually performing?

And, our research on police response times illustrates why consistent performance measurement matters. Everyone intuitively understands why response time matters. A person calls the police. How long does it take for help to arrive? But when we began

studying response times across Ontario, we found significant differences in how they were measured and reported.

But one of the strengths of Ontario's modernized oversight framework is that it allows us to engage not only with questions of performance, but also with some of the most challenging issues facing the policing sector. Issues that often go directly to the heart of public confidence.

The province-wide inspection into police integrity and anti-corruption practices illustrates that point.

That inspection was initiated following allegations that raised legitimate questions about the strength of existing integrity, supervision and accountability systems within Ontario's policing sector.

While those issues emerged in a particular context, the questions they raised extended beyond any single police service.

They engaged issues that affect confidence in policing more broadly. And, when issues arise that have the potential to affect confidence in the broader system, independent oversight has an important role to play.

Not only in examining the substance of those issues. But, in doing so using an approach that is independent, transparent and focused on the public interest. In many respects, public confidence is one of the foundations upon which our policing system depends.

Police services depend on it in delivering their mandate. Police service boards depend on it in exercising effective governance. And, oversight bodies depend on it in carrying out their responsibilities. We all have a role to play in maintaining the public confidence on which we all depend to do what we do.

As much as oversight is sometimes viewed as difficult, challenging or burdensome, it is also an important part of maintaining confidence in the institutions that the public relies upon.

And, when difficult issues arise that have the potential to affect confidence in the broader system, it is important that there is an independent framework capable of examining those issues, identifying what needs to change, and supporting improvement where improvement is required.

Ontario's modernized oversight framework was designed to support accountability, improve performance, and strengthen both policing and police governance. That means oversight must be capable of identifying non-compliance when it exists.

But, and equally important from a public confidence perspective, it must also be capable of recognizing strong performance when it exists. That has been part of our approach from the beginning. Our role is not simply to identify where standards are not being met.

It is also to understand what is working well and whether there are lessons that may be useful elsewhere in the province. In many respects, that is what I mean when I speak about moving “beyond compliance”.

If a police service or police service board is performing well, we should want to understand why. Increasingly, we are developing a richer understanding of policing and police governance across Ontario. Strong performance can tell us something more than whether the standard has been met. It can help show the sector how the bar can continue to be raised.

Because improving performance does not end at just meeting the compliance finish line.

I want to close on a personal note. Earlier in my career, I had the privilege of working with Justice John Morden on the review that followed the G20 Summit in Toronto.

That work was necessarily retrospective. A significant policing event had taken place, public confidence had been tested and fundamentally shaken, and we were looking back, asking difficult questions about governance, accountability and oversight, and about what needed to change.

In the years since, I have had the opportunity to work on policing policy and legislative reform, to work directly in police governance, and now, as Ontario’s first Inspector General of Policing, to apply the modernized framework that emerged from that broader evolution.

There is something very full-circle about that for me. I have seen first-hand why the ability to look back matters. Accountability requires it. We need institutions capable of examining difficult events independently, fairly, and legitimately with transparency.

But modern oversight also gives us the ability to look across the system while it is operating, to connect what we are seeing in real time; to recognize when an issue in one place may tell us something larger; and, where possible, to identify risk before it becomes a more significant problem.

We are still relatively early in the life of the CSPA. Many of you in this room will help shape how this framework develops in practice – through the advice you give, the governance decisions you support, the policies and procedures you help develop, the arguments you advance, and the way these early interpretations are applied.

Most members of the public might never read section 11, Regulation 392/23, or an Inspector General Decision. But, they will experience our legal framework in practice – through the policing they receive, the quality of the governance behind it, and the accountability they see when difficult issues arise.

And, ultimately, that is where the concept of adequate and effective policing has to have meaning.

Not simply as a legal standard we interpret or a threshold we assess, but in whether Ontario’s policing system is capable of meeting the needs of its communities.

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COAST clinical capacity and service continuity

Written submission to the London Police Service Board
For the November 19, 2026 correspondence package
Althea McIntosh
Prepared November 9, 2026
Correspondence reviewed through November 9, 2026

Purpose and established correspondence

I ask the Board to consider requesting and publishing a report from the Chief explaining COAST's clinical capacity and continuity arrangements, informed by the operating partners. The report would establish the clinical support on which LPS relies, any proposed or approved changes, and the resulting implications for police deployment, service availability, and costs.

I make this submission in my own capacity. I am developing reporting on COAST for intended publication with Antler River Media (ARM), with whom I have an existing editorial working relationship. I do not represent ARM institutionally.

On October 26, I wrote to St. Joseph's Health Care London, LPS, CMHA Thames Valley Addiction and Mental Health Services and LHSC, copying the Board. Public reporting had raised questions about St. Joseph's continued clinical participation. I sought five facts: **whether participation is changing; effective dates; clinical positions before and after any change; effects on service hours, caseload, or response capacity**; and **replacement or mitigation arrangements**.

On November 5, I followed up, requesting available information by November 6 and dates for outstanding answers. Chief Governance Officer Stephanie Johanssen then offered to work with the Office of the Chief to identify available police-side information. She explained that a formal directive for a Chief's report would require a motion brought forward and approved at a Board meeting. I recognize that distinction: this submission invites the Board to consider that action.

What remains unresolved

As of November 9, the correspondence reviewed for this submission contains no substantive partner answer to the five service questions. The automatic acknowledgements from LHSC and CMHATV concern routing or availability. Ms.

Johanssen's November 5 and 6 replies establish a procedural route and an offer to seek information; they do not themselves confirm staffing or capacity.

In related provincial correspondence, Mr. Kernaghan's office confirmed that he wrote to the Minister. On November 5, he also reported hand-delivering the letter and submitting Order Paper questions 291-293. These are further accountability steps, distinct from answers establishing the clinical capacity available to COAST.

The unresolved questions are therefore bounded. Is St. Joseph's contribution changing, and when? What clinical roles and filled full-time equivalents are available before and after? What hours, caseload, and response capacity will those resources support? What replacement arrangements are approved, funded, and ready, and what covers any interim gap? These unanswered questions establish an information gap.

Relevance to police oversight

The Board describes its work as monitoring performance and reports from the Chief, overseeing budgets and strategic initiatives, and hearing public delegations.[1] The 2024-2027 Strategic Plan identifies expansion of partner-led responses such as COAST as an objective.[2]

Clinical availability could affect the responses LPS can undertake with health partners, officer deployment, and costs. These effects require assessment; they should not be presumed. The relevant question for the Board is **what service arrangements LPS can rely on** and **how their adequacy will be assessed if a partner contribution changes**.

Hospital employment decisions remain with the responsible hospital. Partner information should be attributed to the organization confirming it, with any limits on police knowledge stated. Allocated positions should be distinguished from filled positions, and funded proposals from available service capacity.

Action requested

I ask the Board to consider adopting a motion requesting a public written report from the Chief on COAST continuity, addressing:

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[1] London Police Service Board, "Board Meetings".
[2] London Police Service, "2024-2027 Strategic Plan", community-partnership action concerning the COAST model.

- Partner clinical staffing before and after any proposed or approved change, including roles, headcount, full-time equivalents, and vacancies.
- Effective dates; service hours, caseload, and response capacity; and the basis for comparable before-and-after assessments.
- Anticipated police-deployment effects and fiscal implications, including the basis and uncertainty of any estimates.
- Replacement or mitigation arrangements, committed resources, responsible organizations, and interim coverage.
- Outstanding commitments and the timetable for completing and publishing the continuity plan.

If a complete report is unavailable on November 19, I ask the Board to receive an interim status report and establish a date for the substantive report. Any completed plan should identify how delivery will be monitored.

My request can change with the evidence. A complete plan would shift attention toward monitoring delivery; partial answers would narrow the remaining questions. The objective is a published account of what clinical service will be available, from whom, and when.

COAST continuity evidence appendix

Althea McIntosh

For the November 19, 2026 correspondence package

Prepared November 9, 2026

Correspondence reviewed through November 9, 2026

A. Evidence status

No substantive service-capacity answer from St. Joseph's, LPS, CMHATV, or LHSC was located in the correspondence reviewed through November 9. In particular, the five questions remain open as to participation, effective date, clinical positions, hours/caseload/response capacity, and replacement or mitigation arrangements. LHSC and CMHATV sent automatic acknowledgements.

Stephanie Johanssen's replies establish a procedural route and an offer to seek available police-side information. They do not themselves answer the five service questions. Her early request to the Chair is not confirmation that a delegation has been accepted.

The provincial correspondence records further inquiry and parliamentary action. Mr. Kernaghan's account is attributed to him; it is not presented as an answer from the Minister or as evidence of the cause of any service change.

B. Correspondence chronology

October 26 — Joint inquiry. Sent to St. Joseph's, LPS, CMHATV, and LHSC, with LPSB copied. Requested the five facts and a published continuity plan, seeking a response by November 4. The full body appears below under section C, "Original October 26 Inquiry".

October 26 — Automatic acknowledgements and media clarification. Automatic acknowledgements received from LHSC and CMHATV. I clarified to LHSC that the inquiry concerned reporting for intended publication with ARM. *Classification*: acknowledgement and routing.

October 28 — Constituency-office action. Mr. Kernaghan's office emailed a COAST letter to Minister Jones, copying me. Constituency assistant Mikey Temple confirmed that the office had sought the information and would share the response. *Classification*: action on the inquiry; no service-capacity answer.

November 5 — Partner follow-up. Follow-up sent to the operating partners, with LPSB copied, requesting available information by November 6 and dates for outstanding answers. CMHATV sent an automatic acknowledgement. *Classification*: outgoing follow-up and automatic response.

November 5 — Procedural inquiry. Separate procedural inquiry sent to the Board office about inconsistent, published notice and speaking-time rules.

November 5 — Board-office response. Chief Governance Officer Stephanie Johanssen confirmed receipt of the partner inquiry. She offered to work with the Office of the Chief on information within police responsibilities, explained the need for a Board motion for a formal report, and specified November 10 for correspondence package submissions. She stated a five-minute delegation limit and that participation remained discretionary. *Classification*: procedural and jurisdictional response; offer to seek information.

November 5 — Parliamentary follow-up. Mr. Kernaghan reported hand-delivering his letter and submitting Order Paper questions 291-293. I thanked him and indicated that I would refer to the questions in my Board submission. *Classification*: reported parliamentary follow-up; not a substantive answer to the clinical-capacity questions.

November 6 — Confirmation of intended submission. I confirmed by sent email that I intended to provide a focused written submission by November 10, requested available police-side information, and asked about delegation timing and later evidence.

November 6 — Procedural accommodation. Ms. Johanssen said governance processes and website information were being updated. She undertook to make an early delegation request to the Chair and advise me of his response. She also confirmed that substantive responses arriving after November 10 could be sent to her and would reach the Board. *Classification*: procedural accommodation; no confirmed speaking approval.

November 9 — Evidence review. Correspondence reviewed for this package. No further substantive partner answer or Chair decision was located. This records the material available to me.

C. Original October 26 inquiry

From: Althea McIntosh
To: roy.butler@sjhc.london.on.ca; ooc@londonpolice.ca; info@cmhatv.ca; media@lhsc.on.ca
Cc: lpsb@lpsb.ca
Sent: October 26, 2026, at 10:48 a.m. Eastern
Subject: Re: COAST clinical capacity and a published continuity plan

Body reproduced below; line wrapping and formatting normalized.

Dear Dr. Butler and COAST partner representatives,

Public reporting has raised a question about St. Joseph's continued clinical participation in COAST. I am seeking a documented account of whether that participation is changing and how the program's clinical capacity will be maintained. Please route this inquiry to your organization's COAST program lead and the executive responsible for its participation.

Please provide written answers to the five questions below, with each organization confirming the facts and commitments within its responsibility. A coordinated response from the operating partners would be welcome; please identify which organization will lead it. Please respond by November 4, 2026. If a coordinated response requires additional time, please provide the information already available to your organization by that date and identify when the outstanding answers will follow.

1. **Participation:** Is St. Joseph's clinical participation in COAST changing? Please distinguish any proposal under consideration from an approved decision and specify the nature of the change.
2. **Effective date:** When would each change take effect, including any transition period?
3. **Clinical positions:** How many clinical positions are allocated to COAST immediately before and after any change, by contributing organization and professional role? Please provide both headcount and full-time equivalents, distinguishing allocated positions from filled positions.
4. **Service capacity:** Will service hours, caseload, or response capacity change? Please provide comparable before-and-after figures, distinguishing current activity from projected capacity, and explain the basis for any assessment that capacity will be maintained.
5. **Replacement or mitigation:** If St. Joseph's withdraws or reduces its contribution, what replacement or mitigation arrangement will preserve clinical capacity? Please identify the responsible provider, committed staffing and funding, implementation date, and coverage during any interim gap. Distinguish approved commitments from arrangements still under negotiation.

   Please publish the continuity plan and provide its link. If the plan is incomplete, please identify what is settled, what remains unresolved, who is responsible for resolving it, and when the completed plan will be available. If no change is planned, please confirm that explicitly.

The London Police Service Board is copied for its oversight role. I request that the Board obtain and publish a written report from the Chief for consideration at its November 19 meeting, addressing partner staffing, service hours and capacity, expected effects on police deployment, replacement or mitigation arrangements, and fiscal implications. This request concerns service continuity and police-governance responsibilities; hospital staffing decisions remain with the responsible hospital.

The substantive question is what clinical service will be available, from whom, and when. A statement that "services will continue" should therefore be accompanied by the staffing, capacity, and implementation details that make that assurance assessable.

Thank you for your attention to these questions.

Sincerely,
Althea McIntosh

D. Later answers

No substantive partner answer has been added as of this appendix's November 9 cutoff. Any later response should be supplied with its author, organization, date, relevant facts, and an explanation of what it resolves or leaves open, using the separate evidence-supplement template.

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
INTERVIEW:

Stephanie Johanssen: Police boards play a vital role in AI oversight – but they don't need to be tech experts

OPEN



10th November 2026
Christine Townsend, Policing Insight



As artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly turns up in Canadian policing budgets, contracts and software updates, the Chief Governance Officer of Ontario's London Police Service Board says civilian oversight bodies can govern it without becoming technical experts; Stephanie Johanssen spoke to Policing Insight's Christine Townsend about where boards sit alongside chiefs, the questions to ask before approving an AI contract, and why

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consistency across jurisdictions matters.

Stephanie Johanssen was given 10 minutes to speak about AI governance at the Canadian Association of Police Governance conference in August, and quickly realised it was nowhere near enough.

The notes she prepared grew into a detailed resource guide and a longer webinar, shaped by conversations with board members, police officers and people in the technology industry. What she found was “a lot of will to work together”, and a sector that wants AI governance to develop “in a co-ordinated way, with clear roles and shared expectations”.

“AI does not always come before a board as a separate item labelled ‘AI’,” Johanssen explained. More often it arrives inside something familiar, such as a budget request, a contract renewal or a feature bundled into a larger platform, and sometimes it surfaces only after a complaint.

In practice, that means a board can be weighing the cost and privacy implications of a system without ever being told it is making an AI decision.

Ms Johanssen began in Professional Standards at the Vancouver Police Department, learning how public complaints and internal investigations work, before joining the Vancouver Police Board in 2014 and becoming its Executive Director in 2018. That appointment, she explained, came “at the cusp of a major shift in police oversight”.

Street checks, the murder of George Floyd, the defund movement and a surge in anti-Asian hate crimes during the pandemic all landed on volunteer boards at once.

“Policing became increasingly contentious, and both public confidence and police morale declined,” she told Policing Insight. “As volunteer oversight bodies, police boards were expected to manage these complexities, often with insufficient resources.”

She moved to Ontario in 2023 and joined the London board in 2024, just as new legislation expanded board responsibilities and created an Inspectorate of Policing. “It has been a sector-wide learning curve,” she said, and she was promoted to Chief Governance Officer in December 2025.

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Oversight and operations

AI is not a future question for Canadian policing. “AI is already deeply integrated into Canadian policing, not least of all because it is deeply integrated into the nature of the crime police are being asked to address,” Ms Johanssen said, pointing to growing fraud, impersonation and manipulated information.

On the policing side, it is being used for investigative support such as facial recognition and case-file summarisation, for frontline reporting including AI-generated report drafts and translation assistance, and for deployment analysis. She expects more of the last: “As crime becomes digitised and video footage becomes part of almost every investigation, AI will be necessary to sort through endless data and keep up with the sheer volume of evidence coming in.”

Some uses, though, should never proceed in her view: those involving “severe, unmitigable bias, unjustified mass surveillance, or fully autonomous decision-making”.

For years, the accepted wisdom was that oversight and operations should stay firmly apart. Johanssen thinks that view has had its day.

“When I first started in police governance, it was widely considered that oversight and operations were entirely separate, with a hard line between them,” she said. “As we continue to navigate a very complex sector where we share the same goal of public safety, this perspective is becoming outdated.”

The point is not that boards should run operations, but that governance exists at two levels. The board sets expectations and asks for assurance; the service decides how systems are assessed, implemented and managed day to day. Neither, she stressed, is complete without the other.

Johanssen offers a simple test for where a requirement belongs: “If a clause would have to change because the service changed a form, a role or a piece of software, it belongs to the Chief. If it would change only because the board’s expectations changed, it belongs to the board.” In other words, the board owns the why and the limits, and the chief owns the how.

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Boards are made up of community members, often with no policing or te
and Ms Johanssen sees that as a strength rather than a gap.

“Board members govern the police on behalf of the community and, as representatives of the community, are expected to take the needs, values, and expectations of those they serve into account,” she explained.

“From that perspective, they are better positioned than a policing expert to govern policing in ways that meet those needs, values, and expectations.”

There is a caveat however, and she is quick to name it: members still need to seek clarification on technical points and base decisions on evidence. But the questions that matter most are ones any resident might ask. “If a board member is asking a question, it’s likely that a member of the community has that same question.”

The accountability gap

Before approving an AI contract, Ms Johanssen suggests asking what problem the tool solves, what evidence supports the benefit, how errors and bias will be caught, and what the total cost of ownership will be, including what protections the service has secured from the vendor.

“If a board isn’t comfortable with the answers or clear on the impacts, it’s safe to assume the public won’t be either,” she said.

Her presentation worked through an example: an AI transcription system for interviews that needs board approval because of the contract value. It may save time, but errors could have serious consequences. If the vendor later adds a materially different function, such as generating investigative summaries, the service should reassess and return to the board when an agreed threshold is met, “not for approval at every stage”.

Asked what keeps board members awake, Ms Johanssen described an accountability gap: boards are answerable for the lawful and fair use of AI without always knowing where it is being used, what has changed, or whether it is working. “Are they doing enough? Are they doing too much? Is it worth it? What happens if something goes wrong?” she said.

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Her answer is to govern before something goes wrong. “Good governanc
uncertainty from the uncertain before something does go awry,” she told Policing Insight.

The alternative, she argues, is not neutral. “Waiting is itself a governance decision, and while a board waits, systems continue to be acquired, and features continue to be enabled.”

Avoidance, whether leaving it to the experts or waiting for a complaint, sits at one end of the spectrum; overreach, such as approving every tool or sitting on the service’s AI committee, sits at the other.

Loss of legitimacy

The London Police Service Board adopted an AI policy in March 2026, drawing language and risk thresholds from existing policies in Toronto, Durham and York, then adapting them.

Ms Johanssen is firm that anything set at board level should be “plain language enough that any member of the public can reasonably pick it up, read it, and understand what it means and why it exists”.

The policy classifies each technology by its potential impact on rights, freedoms, safety, equity and public trust rather than by product name, so it need not be rewritten every time a vendor changes a feature. The highest-risk category is prohibited, and anything rated high or moderate needs board approval, with assessment completed before procurement rather than after.

The non-negotiable, she said, is accountability: “AI should support human decision-making, but the actual responsibility must remain with identifiable people, particularly where AI-assisted decisions could affect a person’s rights or safety.”

Others are finding their own routes in. Peel’s Police Service Board held three public consultation sessions on AI in autumn 2025 and published its report in April, while Toronto publishes an inventory of AI uses with risk levels. Ms Johanssen treats that inventory as “a transparency reference, not a complete governance model”, and notes that Canada still has no single binding, police-specific national AI framework.

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Asked where the greatest risk to public trust lies, Johanssen needed just t
legitimacy.

“Policing depends not only on whether something is lawful and effective, but on whether the public believes its use is fair, accountable, and consistent with their needs and expectations,” she explained. “If a system is entirely lawful and effective but people don’t understand why it’s being used, or believe its impacts are unfair, they will lose confidence.”

The insight here is that the damage may come less from the error than from the silence around it. “The risk is less the error itself and more about an unexplained use or an apparent lack of accountability in an error.”

Confident governance

Seen against that backdrop, timing matters. Canada’s privacy authorities called for strong independent oversight of police facial recognition in a joint statement in May 2022, and Ms Johanssen points to the Morden review of policing at the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto, whose central lesson was that a board cannot hold a chief accountable if important information reaches it too late, or not at all.

She is careful to say AI has not generally reached an Ontario “critical point”, though a serious misidentification or a vendor security breach could. “AI doesn’t care where one jurisdiction ends, and another begins,” said Ms Johanssen, who calls collaboration between boards her favourite subject to be asked about.

Local law and context will always matter, but she argues Canadians should be able to expect a common standard of public safety, rights protection and accountability wherever they live. That could mean shared templates for AI inventories and board reporting, common definitions of risk, and an agreed set of questions for services to answer before significant technology is approved. “Boards have no reason to start from scratch,” she said.

Vendors have a part to play, too. Contracts determine what information a service can demand, so “oversight needs to be built into the contract from the start”, and suppliers should recognise that boards are often the ones signing.

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Taken together, her hope for the next three years is modest in tone but r
want police boards to move from learning about AI and reacting to individual issues to governing it confidently as part of their ordinary responsibilities."

For anyone sitting on a board who feels out of their depth, her advice is both practical and reassuring: "Your work is extremely important and has a direct impact on the safety of the people who live in your community," she said.

"Worry less about technical detail and more about representing the people you serve. You are not expected to understand every acronym or detail, you are expected to lend perspective and make decisions on behalf of those who can't."

Whether a shared baseline arrives before the next contract does remains to be seen, but the questions, as she points out, are ones boards already know how to ask.

Picture © Alexander Supertramp / Shutterstock

This article can be found here:
Stephanie Johanssen: Police boards play a vital role in AI oversight – but they don't need to be tech experts

Policinginsight

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LONDON POLICE SERVICE

OPEN REPORT TO THE LONDON POLICE SERVICE BOARD

Report Number	2611EA01
Board Meeting Date	November 19, 2026

Investigation Pursuant to section 81 of the *Community Safety and Policing Act*, SIU 26-OOD-106

Paul Bastien, Deputy Chief

REASON FOR REPORT

☐ Seeking Decision

☑ Receive for Information/Update

RECOMMENDATION(S)

THAT the London Police Service Board receive the report for information purposes.

SUMMARY

In the early morning hours on March 6, 2026, London Police Service officers responded to assist a female who had consumed alcohol and alleging she had been sexually assaulted sometime in the recent past. The female was transported back to her residence by police, where she entered her apartment. Later that same day, she was found to be deceased within her apartment. The Special Investigations Unit investigated and on June 24, 2026, reported that there was no basis to believe any officer engaged in unlawful conduct and determined that no criminal charges were warranted. A subsequent investigation under section 81(1) of the Community Safety and Policing Act found that the officers' actions were lawful, consistent with Service procedures, and did not constitute misconduct.

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

There are no direct financial implications associated with the recommendation in this report.

BACKGROUND

This report is submitted pursuant to s. 81 of the Community Safety and Policing Act.

DISCUSSION

Incident summary

A citizen contacted 911 advising a female had approached him and was claiming several males attempted to rape her earlier in the evening.

On March 6, 2026, London Police Service members attended the scene and spoke with the female, who had been drinking and was demonstrating some balance issues and slurred speech. She reported several issues to police including an alleged sexual assault with a timeframe that changed between happening years ago and hours ago. She then advised it had been reported to police earlier that day. She also reported her purse had been stolen. She requested a ride home from police to her residence, which was provided. The female was observed safely entering her apartment by the transporting officers.

Coincidentally, a Sheriff had planned to attend the apartment and evict the female from the premises later that same day. When the Sherriff attended, the female was found deceased inside the apartment. Emergency Medical Services and London Police Service responded to a 911 call. The immediate area around the deceased female was littered with drug paraphernalia, including freshly burnt pieces of tin foil.

As a result of the recently documented police involvement with the deceased, the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) invoked its mandate and commenced an independent investigation into the circumstances.

Findings of SIU Investigation

On June 24, 2026, the SIU concluded its investigation and determined there were no reasonable grounds to believe that any officer had committed a criminal offence. The SIU found that the officers were lawfully attempting to assist the female the night before she died and that their actions were reasonable and appropriate given the circumstances. No criminal charges were laid.

CONCLUSION

Findings of LPS investigation

Following completion of the SIU investigation, the London Police Service conducted a review pursuant to section 81(1) of the *Community Safety and Policing Act*. The administrative investigation included a comprehensive review of witness statements, police reports, duty notes, body-worn camera footage, communications recordings, applicable legislation, and Service procedures. The review concluded that the officers acted lawfully, that their treatment of the female was reasonable and responsive to the type of behaviour she was exhibiting. It was noted that one officer had failed to activate their body-worn camera during the interaction; however, this was appropriately determined to be a work performance concern and was not sufficiently negligent or intentional that it would rise to the level of misconduct.

APPROVED FOR SUBMISSION BY CHIEF THAI TRUONG

X T. Truong

Thai Truong, Chief of Police

***Alternative formats, translation, and communication supports are available on request**

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LONDON POLICE SERVICE

OPEN REPORT TO THE LONDON POLICE SERVICE BOARD

Report Number	2611EA02
Board Meeting Date	November 19, 2026

Aggregate Report on Disciplinary Measures Imposed Under s. 200(1) CSPA

Paul Bastien, Deputy Chief

REASON FOR REPORT

☐ Seeking Decision

☑ Receive for Information/Update

RECOMMENDATION(S)

1. That the London Police Service Board receive this report pursuant to section 215(1) of the *Community Safety and Policing Act*, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 1, Sched. 1 (CSPA) for information purposes.

2. That the Board publish this report on the internet pursuant to section 215(2)(a) of the CSPA.

3. That the Board forward this report to the Complaints Director pursuant to section 215(2)(b) of the CSPA.

SUMMARY

This report outlines the aggregate disciplinary measures that were imposed on London Police Service officers under Part XII of the CSPA between April 1, 2026, and September 30, 2026.

During the reporting period, discipline under the CSPA was imposed on three police officers of the London Police Service. In each case, the disciplinary measures were imposed without a hearing and with the officer's consent.

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

There are no direct financial implications associated with the recommendation in this report.

BACKGROUND

Section 200(1) CSPA grants the Chief the authority to impose any combination of the following disciplinary measures on a police officer without holding a hearing if the officer consents to the imposition of the measure(s):

- suspension without pay for a period not exceeding 30 days or 240 hours
- forfeiture of not more than three days or 24 hours pay
- forfeiture of not more than 20 days or 160 hours off
- reprimand
- counselling, treatment or training
- participation in a specified program or activity

If the police officer does not consent to the disciplinary measure imposed by the Chief, the officer may apply to the Ontario Police Arbitration and Adjudication Commission (OPAAC) to appoint an adjudicator to hold a hearing into the matter. Likewise, in cases in which the Chief is seeking demotion or termination, the Chief may apply to the OPAAC to appoint an adjudicator to hold a hearing.

Section 215 CSPA requires the Chief to report to the Board prior to June 1 and December 1 of each year regarding aggregate disciplinary measures imposed under Part XII of the Act. In turn, the Act requires that the Board post the report on its website within 30 days of receipt and forward the report to the Complaints Director, Law Enforcement Complaints Agency.

Ontario Regulation 90/24 CSPA requires that the semi-annual Aggregate Report on Disciplinary Measures contain the following:

1. Each provision of the Code of Conduct for Police Officers made under the CSPA under which a disciplinary measure was imposed, which measure was imposed, and the number of times that each measure was imposed in relation to the provision.

2. The number of times a disciplinary measure was imposed without a hearing; following a hearing requested by the police officer; and following a hearing requested by the Chief when demotion or dismissal was sought.

3. The average and total number of days or hours deducted in cases where a disciplinary measure includes suspension without pay, forfeiture of pay, or forfeiture of time off.

DISCUSSION

The above data is set out at Appendix A in the Tables 1 through 3, respectively. Disciplinary measures imposed in relation to misconduct that occurred prior to April 1, 2024, are subject to provisions of the Police Services Act and are not included in this report.

CONCLUSION

Pursuant to O. Reg. 90/24, this report will continue to be provided to the Board semi-annually in May and November for the reporting periods of April 1 to September 30 and October 1 to March 31 respectively.

APPROVED FOR SUBMISSION BY CHIEF THAI TRUONG

X T. Truong

Thai Truong, Chief of Police

ATTACHMENT

1. Appendix A - Aggregate Disciplinary Measures Data

***Alternative formats, translation, and communication supports are available on request**

Appendix A

Aggregate Disciplinary Measures Data

Table 1 – Code of Conduct Provision Under which a Disciplinary Measure was Imposed Under s. 200(1) CSPA

Sec.	Nature of Conduct	Suspension w/o pay	Forfeiture of pay	Forfeiture of hours[1]	Reprimand	Counselling/ treatment/ training[1]	Program/ activity
5	Contravention of the Ontario *Human Rights Code*	-	-	1	-	1	-
10	Undermining public trust	-	-	1	-	1	-
12	Abusive language	-	-	1	-	1	-
27	Performance of Duties	-	-	2	-	1	-

Table 2 - Number of Times a Disciplinary Measure was Imposed

Circumstance (Hearing/No Hearing)	
Discipline imposed without hearing (officer consent)	3[2]
Discipline imposed following hearing requested by officer	-
Discipline imposed following hearing requested by Chief	-

Table 3 - Hours Deducted

Disciplinary Measure Imposed	Hours (total)	Hours (average)
Suspension without pay	-	-
Forfeiture of pay	-	-
Forfeiture of hours off	92	18.4[3]

[1] One officer was found to have engaged in misconduct under four provisions of O. Reg. 407/23 of the CSPA. A blanket discipline measure was imposed in respect of the totality of the misconduct.

[2] Discipline for one officer was planned to be sought by a recommendation to the London Police Service Board pursuant to s. 212 CSPA, as termination of probationary employment was sought, however, the officer resigned prior to termination.

[3] The average hours forfeited was calculated by dividing the total number of forfeited hours by the total number of misconduct findings for which a disciplinary measure was imposed during the reporting period.

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LONDON POLICE SERVICE BOARD OPEN REPORT

APPROVAL OF THE 2027-2030 STRATEGIC PLAN

Report Number	2611PB01
Board Meeting Date	November 19, 2026

SUBMITTED BY

Stephanie Johanssen, LPSB Chief Governance Officer

REASON FOR REPORT

☑ Seeking Decision

RECOMMENDATION(S)

THAT the London Police Service Board:

1. Approve the 2027–2030 Strategic Plan for Policing in London, substantially in the form attached to this report, to take effect January 1, 2027, at which time it will replace the 2024–2027 Strategic Plan, which will remain in effect until December 31, 2026.
2. Direct the Chief of Police to report to the Board in the first quarter of 2027 with an Implementation Plan, as an extension of the Strategic Plan, that translates it into specific measures, actions, responsibilities and timelines; identifies the resources required, including future budget needs; and is updated as needs, risks and results evolve, with material changes reported to the Board.
3. Direct that the Implementation Plan include a Performance Measurement Framework with qualitative and quantitative measures, baselines, data sources and, where appropriate, targets.
4. Direct that the Implementation Plan and Performance Measurement Framework address all performance objectives and indicators required by s. 39 of the *Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019* (CSPA) and O. Reg. 399/23 General Matters Under the Authority of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, including requirements not presented as stand-alone measures in the Strategic Plan, to support legislative compliance, Board oversight and public reporting.

And THAT

5. The approved Strategic Plan be published on the Board's website before it takes effect on January 1, 2027, in accessible formats.
6. The Board develop a Board Policy under s. 38 of the CSPA setting out its expectations of the Service for reporting to the Board, including mandated reporting, forward-looking financial reporting, and human resources and legal reporting, so that reporting supports the Board's oversight of the Strategic Plan's priorities and outcomes.

SUMMARY

This report recommends approval of the Board's 2027-2030 Strategic Plan for Policing in London.

Guided by the overarching purpose of "**A Safer London Now, and in the Future**," the Plan establishes three interconnected policing priorities in response to London's public safety needs:

1. PRIORITY: Safe Streets and Neighbourhoods

Advancing safer communities through responsive policing, appropriate police presence and effective enforcement.

OBJECTIVE 1: Prioritize Community Safety and Confidence
OBJECTIVE 2: Address Risks to Road Safety

2. PRIORITY: Shared Solutions

Collaborating with partners to address complex safety challenges, prevent escalation and support access to alternative responses.

OBJECTIVE 3: Enhance Coordinated Responses to Complex Social Challenges
OBJECTIVE 4: Support Collaborative Prevention, Diversion and Alternative Response

3. PRIORITY: Future-Ready Policing

Building a skilled, supported and prepared workforce to deliver effective service today while responsibly planning for the people, technology and resources needed for the future.

OBJECTIVE 5: Strengthen Organizational Health, Readiness and Adaptability
OBJECTIVE 6: Advance Accountable Resourcing and Service Modernization

Together, the Board's three overarching policing priorities connect immediate safety needs with prevention, partnership and long-term readiness. Safe Streets and Neighbourhoods sets out what Londoners expect of policing, Shared Solutions addresses what policing cannot resolve alone, and Future-Ready Policing ensures the Service has the people and resources to effectively deliver on the first two Priorities.

The Plan also identifies five Board Governance Priorities and explains how implementation, measurement and public reporting will support accountability and transparency.

The Plan sets intended outcomes, not guaranteed results. The Board will hold the Service accountable for its policing responsibilities. Many outcomes, particularly under Shared Solutions, also depend on partners, available services and community conditions, and reporting will make this distinction clear.

The recommendations also direct the Chief to bring forward an Implementation Plan and Performance Measurement Framework that turn the Plan into measurable action and meet all CSPA performance requirements, including measures not shown separately in the Plan, and to publish the Plan and a Board Policy on Service reporting in an accessible format.

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Approval of the Plan is not tied to a specific dollar amount. The Chief's Implementation Plan will identify resource requirements and links to existing Service plans and strategies.

Implementing and monitoring the Plan before the next multi-year budget will provide reliable information for future operating and capital requests. A Board Policy will set expectations for forward-looking financial reporting through the Finance Advisory Committee.

BACKGROUND

Why a new Strategic Plan, why now

In July 2025, the Board approved the early redevelopment of the 2024-2027 Strategic Plan after a preliminary gap analysis identified the need for stronger alignment with the *Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019* (CSPA). The current Plan was developed before the CSPA took effect on April 1, 2024.

The CSPA requires the Board to adopt a strategic plan for policing addressing specified areas: adequate and effective policing; the Service's objectives and priorities; quantitative and qualitative performance objectives and indicators; interactions with identified communities and populations; information technology; resource planning; and police facilities.

The Plan must also summarize the consultations undertaken, explain how it addresses identified needs and concerns, consider London's Community Safety and Well-Being Plan, and be reviewed at least once every four years.

The Board directed that the new Plan be built on comprehensive community consultation that meets legislative requirements, supported by independent research and ongoing consultation with the Chief and Service.

The Board developed strategic outcomes for each objective with the Service. A Service working group provided operational, planning, data and subject-matter expertise to assess whether the proposed outcomes and indicators were relevant, achievable and reasonable. This collaboration informed the Plan, while the Board remains responsible for strategic direction and the Chief for implementation.

Introducing the Plan before the next multi-year budget submission allows time to implement its direction, establish baselines and monitor early results.

Community consultation and engagement

In 2025, the Board engaged Advanis, an independent Canadian research firm, to lead a broad consultation on community needs, values, expectations and concerns about policing. By using several methods, the Board heard both community-wide views and the experiences of people and groups with distinct safety concerns or relationships with policing. Advanis also gathered perspectives from the Service's senior leadership and the London Police Association.

- 1,102 London residents aged 16 and older completed a randomly recruited and statistically valid community survey between April 9 and May 4, 2026. Results were weighted to align with age and gender population counts from the 2021 Census.
- An open public survey link was promoted through the Board's website, social channels, public facilities and community distribution lists, generating a further 37 submissions.
- Ten independently facilitated focus groups were held with 68 participants representing the general public, seniors, youth, women, multi-faith leaders, business owners, community leaders, newcomers, Indigenous leaders and members of 2SLGBTQIA+ communities.
- Two facilitated public input sessions, advertised on social media and radio, were held on April 14 and 16, 2026.

To support open, candid discussion, Board and Service representatives did not attend the focus groups, and Advanis provided the Board only with aggregated results that were not attributed to any individual. The Board also wrote directly to City Council, local First Nations Band Councils, school boards and other community organizations and leaders for input, and kept the public informed throughout through public Board reports and online updates.

The findings pointed to shared priorities: safer neighbourhoods and public spaces; timely, effective police response; crime prevention and enforcement; coordinated responses to complex social challenges; fair and respectful policing; community trust; responsible use of resources; and clear public accountability. These findings directly shaped the Plan's three policing priorities and its implementation and reporting approach.

DISCUSSION

A clear direction for policing in London

The Plan is organized around the overarching purpose, "A Safer London Now, and in the Future." Its three interconnected priorities link what Londoners said they need now with what is required to meet the needs of a growing, diverse and changing city.

Under the CSPA, adequate and effective policing includes core policing functions that the Service must deliver and the Board holds it accountable for. Delivering them depends on supporting work: building community trust, strengthening partnerships, investing in member

well-being and training, and planning for the future. The Plan distinguishes these core responsibilities from shared outcomes the Service contributes to alongside partners..

WHAT IS ADEQUATE AND EFFECTIVE POLICING

Under *Ontario's Adequate and Effective Policing regulation* (O. Reg. 392/23), policing must be delivered reasonably, having regard to London's policing needs, its local characteristics, how similar communities are policed, the Service's past effectiveness and best practices, informed by quantitative and qualitative information. The Plan's consultation, baselines and Performance Measurement Framework are designed to provide that evidence.

The Inspector General describes this standard as asking whether a response falls within a range of appropriate responses in context, rather than requiring perfection.

How the Strategic Plan responds to what was heard

Safe Streets and Neighbourhoods addresses concerns about safety, crime, police presence, response and follow-up. It focuses on safer public spaces, effective response and reducing road-safety harm, with police presence directed where evidence and local conditions show it is needed. This priority centres on core policing functions.

Shared Solutions addresses complex social challenges, including mental health, substance use, housing and vulnerability, that policing cannot resolve alone and where police are not always the right response. It supports work with government, health, housing, social service, community and business partners to clarify the role of police and align responsibilities, so people get the help they need.

Clearer roles and stronger coordination are intended to enable earlier intervention, diversion and alternative responses. Because results also depend on partners and available services, the Service's role is to contribute to these shared outcomes. Where no suitable alternative exists, police remain responsible for their core duties and immediate safety needs, and the Board will advocate with partners for the services and funding needed.

Future-Ready Policing responds to concerns about capacity, changing crime and value for public spending. It focuses on the workforce, capacity, facilities, technology and resources needed to provide effective service now and adapt over time, with accountable reporting on results. This priority supports the Service's ability to sustain the first two as London grows and demands change.

The Plan also recognizes that experiences of safety and policing differ across London. Community input showed different views on visibility, trust, fairness and safety. In response, the Plan emphasizes fair, community-informed policing, accessible support, meaningful engagement and transparent reporting.

Our people

The people of the London Police Service are central to effective and sustainable policing. Their knowledge, well-being and workplace experience shape the service Londoners receive.

In a Board-led internal survey, five overarching needs were identified:

- A supportive workplace
- Sustainable staffing
- Fair and transparent opportunities
- Clear direction and communication
- Readiness for change

These needs are reflected mainly in Future-Ready Policing through outcomes related to member support and engagement, professional development, fair advancement, representation, organizational capacity, cultural understanding and timely wellness supports.

The Board will monitor organizational health, capacity and readiness. The Chief and leadership team will determine and carry out the operational response.

Planning for service and resource needs

The Plan connects its strategic outcomes to long-term planning for staffing, facilities, fleet, information technology and other major resources. Budget and capital requests will explain how proposed investments advance the Plan and how their results and public value will be assessed. The Plan also treats responsible technology, AI, and data use as part of modern policing and public accountability. This includes privacy, cybersecurity, accessibility, human rights, data governance and human oversight.

Implementation and performance measurement

The Strategic Plan sets the Board's direction and intended outcomes. The Chief's Implementation Plan is the operational roadmap. It will identify measures, actions, responsibilities, timelines and resource requirements, and show how Service-level plans and strategies contribute to the intended outcomes.

The Performance Measurement Framework will set out the qualitative and quantitative measures, baselines, data sources and, where appropriate, targets used to assess progress.

Section 39 of the CSPA requires performance objectives and indicators in specified areas: crime prevention; patrol; investigations; community satisfaction; emergency calls; violent, property, youth and drug crime; victim assistance and repeat victimization; interactions with specified communities and populations; and road safety. Any required measure not presented separately in the Strategic Plan must be included in the Chief's Implementation Plan and Performance Measurement Framework.

A Board Policy on reporting will set out, in advance, what the Board needs for oversight. The Chief will continue to determine how the Service delivers and measures outcomes.

Oversight and public reporting

The Board will receive Mid-Year and Year-End Strategic Plan Performance Reports. Mid-year reporting will support oversight and in-year adjustments. Year-end reporting will assess full-year results, inform future implementation and resource decisions, and contribute to the Board's Annual Report. Forward-looking financial reporting through the Finance Advisory Committee will complement these performance reports by connecting results to resourcing.

Public reporting will explain what has been achieved, where attention is needed and how implementation or resources should adapt. It will distinguish results within the Service's responsibility from shared outcomes shaped by partners, community conditions and other external factors. This gives the public a clear picture without reducing the Service's accountability for policing.

Board governance priorities

The Service implements the Plan; the Board provides independent oversight and performance monitoring. For 2027-2030, the Board identified five governance priorities that complement the policing priorities and define the Board's own responsibilities:

1. Governance and Accountability
2. Financial Stewardship and Public Value
3. Technology, Data and Responsible Innovation
4. Community Trust and Transparency
5. Collaboration and Advocacy

Under Collaboration and Advocacy, the Board will work with City Council and partners to set a clear position on where police involvement is required and advocate for the services and funding needed.

CONCLUSION

The 2027-2030 Strategic Plan provides clear, community-informed direction for policing in London and a stronger foundation for Board oversight, resource decisions and public accountability.

ATTACHMENTS

1. Placemat: Strategic Plan One-Pager
2. 2027-2030 Strategic Plan for Policing in London PDF Pamphlet with visuals
3. 2027-2030 Strategic Plan for Policing in London TEXT ONLY version

***Alternative formats, translation, and communication supports for this report are available on request.**

LONDON POLICE SERVICE

OPEN REPORT TO THE LONDON POLICE SERVICE BOARD

Report Number	2611FF01
Board Meeting Date	November 19, 2026

London Police Service Court Security Plan

Roger Ramkissoon, Chief Administrative Officer

REASON FOR REPORT

☐ Seeking Decision

☑ Receive for Information/Update

RECOMMENDATION(S)

THAT the London Police Service Board receive this report and the attached London Police Service Court Security Plan.

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

There are no direct financial implications associated with the recommendation in this report. Court security staffing and infrastructure requirements continue to be addressed through approved budgets, previously authorized initiatives and established budget processes.

BACKGROUND

This report provides the London Police Service Board with a governance-level update on how the London Police Service is implementing and operationalizing court security responsibilities. The Court Security Plan was reviewed and updated in September 2026 and is attached for the Board's information. The plan establishes a coordinated framework for court security at the three locations in London where court proceedings are conducted and supports the Board's oversight of its legislated obligations. Reporting will provide the Board and the public with assurance that court security is maintained, reviewed and adapted to current requirements.

Court security encompasses the personnel, procedures, technology, and physical security measures used to protect people and property at courthouses while maintaining safe public access. Effective court security helps ensure that court proceedings can occur safely and without disruption.

Under section 243 of the *Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019* (CSPA), police service boards are responsible for ensuring that court security functions are provided and that appropriate levels of security are maintained. These responsibilities include ensuring the security of judges, judicial officers, individuals participating in or attending court proceedings, court facilities during operating hours, and persons in custody while on court premises. The Act also requires police service boards to determine appropriate levels of court security.

While court security is a responsibility of police service boards, section 11(2) of the CSPA clarifies that court security is distinct from the legislated requirement to provide adequate and effective policing.

Ontario Regulation 399/23 requires the Chief of Police to prepare and implement a court security plan, establish procedures related to supervision and training, and ensure that court security personnel are capable of performing their assigned duties. The London Police Service Court Security Plan provides the framework through which the Service carries out these operational responsibilities and supports the Board in fulfilling its statutory obligations.

This report provides the Board with information regarding the London Police Service Court Security Plan and supports the Board's oversight of court security responsibilities. The attached plan was reviewed and updated in September 2026 to reflect current court locations, responsibilities, and operating practices.

DISCUSSION

Court security responsibilities and service delivery

The London Police Service provides court security at the Ontario Court of Justice and Superior Court of Justice at 80 Dundas Street, the Provincial Offences Court at 824 Dundas Street, and the London Justice Centre at 333 Richmond Street. The Court and Offender Management Section coordinates London Police Service operations at these sites through sworn officers, Court Prisoner Security Officers and Cadets, supported by supervisors and partner agencies as appropriate.

The Court Security Plan describes the roles of London Police Service units, the lawful authorities available to personnel providing court security, general security and emergency procedures, care and secure custody of persons in custody, and responses to higher-risk events. It also establishes a Court Security Committee to advise the Chief of Police and support ongoing review and evaluation of the plan.

September 2026 review and update

The Court Security Plan was reviewed and updated in September 2026 to ensure that it reflects current court locations, responsibilities and operating practices. The updated plan:

- confirms the application of the plan to all three court locations in London;
- clarifies the roles of the Board, the Chief of Police, the Court Security Committee and the London Police Service units assigned to court security;
- updates site-specific security, emergency response and evacuation information;
- aligns courthouse emergency processes with applicable London Police Service procedures and facility-specific plans; and
- continues the requirement for ongoing review through the Court Security Committee.

Assurance and continuous improvement

The London Police Service uses a layered approach to court security that includes trained personnel, supervision, screening and security equipment, emergency communication systems, risk assessment, and established response procedures. Security concerns are addressed as they arise in collaboration with court administration, the judiciary, Crown representatives, facility operators and other justice partners.

The Service continues to address staffing and infrastructure requirements so that security practices can be appropriately standardized across court locations. At 824 Dundas Street, work is underway to support a court security model that more closely reflects the established approaches at 80 Dundas Street and the London Justice Centre, including the infrastructure and staffing needed to support enhanced screening. These improvements will be implemented as required resources and facility changes are put in place.

Court security is dynamic and must respond to changes in court operations, facilities, risks and provincial direction.

Reporting to the Board

Regular reporting supports the Board in overseeing its court security responsibilities and understanding significant changes, risks, and resource implications related to the delivery of court security. The London Police Service will report to the Board when reviews of the Court Security Plan are completed, when material changes to the plan occur, or when significant developments affecting court security arise that require the Board's awareness, direction, or decision.

CONCLUSION

The September 2026 review and update of the Court Security Plan confirms a current, coordinated framework for delivering court security at all three London court locations. The attached plan and regular reporting provide the Board and the public with assurance that the London Police Service is actively implementing, reviewing and improving the measures required to support safe and secure court operations.

APPROVED FOR SUBMISSION BY CHIEF THAI TRUONG

X T. Truong

Thai Truong, Chief of Police

ATTACHMENTS

N/A

***Alternative formats, translation, and communication supports are available on request**

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LONDON POLICE SERVICE BOARD OPEN REPORT

APPROVAL OF THE BOARD'S GOVERNANCE MANUAL

Report Number	#2611PB02
Board Meeting Date	November 19, 2026

SUBMITTED BY

Stephanie Johanssen, LPSB Chief Governance Officer

REASON FOR REPORT

☑ **Seeking Decision**

RECOMMENDATION(S)

THAT the London Police Service Board (the "Board"):

1. Approve the London Police Service Board Governance Manual (the "Manual") as the Board's rules and procedures pursuant to subsection 46(1) of the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019, and as a living governance framework to guide the Board in carrying out its duties;
2. Direct that legal requirements and parts of the Manual that can be applied immediately take effect upon approval, while other governance practices be introduced over time as the necessary processes, work plans and supports are developed; and
3. Authorize the Chief Governance Officer to make administrative changes, including changes needed to keep the Manual consistent with applicable legislation and regulations, provided they do not change the Board's governance direction, standards, responsibilities or decision-making authority and that any other substantive changes be brought to the Board for approval.
4. Direct the Chief Governance Officer to bring forward a Board Meeting Procedures By-law under subsection 46(1) of the *Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019*, to govern the calling, conduct and proceedings of meetings of the Board and its committees, for the Board's review and approval at a future meeting;

SUMMARY

This report recommends approving the Manual as the Board's rules and procedures under s. 46(1) of the *Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019* (CSPA). The Manual consolidates all responsibilities of the Board and its members into a single reference and sets out how the Board carries out its governance and oversight. The report also recommends bringing forward a Board Meeting Procedures By-law for the Board's review and approval at a future meeting.

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

There are no direct financial implications associated with approving the Manual.

BACKGROUND

S. 46(1) of the CSPA requires every police service board to establish its own rules and procedures for performing its duties under the Act and its regulations. The Manual was developed to meet this requirement and provide a clear structure for how the Board organizes its work, exercises its authority, fulfills its statutory responsibilities and holds itself accountable.

The external MNP review initiated by the Board in 2025 around the Service's Finance, Human Resources and Legal Sections also recommended continuing the development of a governance manual (which was underway at the time) to clearly set out Board roles, responsibilities and communication channels between the Board and the Service, and to support compliance with the enhanced governance requirements of the CSPA.

The Manual was developed over approximately two years. Its scope expanded as additional statutory responsibilities, governance requirements and opportunities to strengthen the Board's practices were identified. It brings together requirements, guidance and research from legislation, Board policies and practices, accountability materials, training resources and the broader police-governance sector.

The Governance Advisory Committee reviewed several versions of the Manual during its development. The Manual also received external legal review, feedback from Police Governance Ontario, input from the Inspectorate of Policing, and a detailed review by the Board's Inspectorate of Policing Zone Advisor, Tom Gervais. Feedback from these reviews was incorporated where appropriate to strengthen legislative alignment and consistency.

Appendix A summarizes the legislation, sector resources, comparator materials, research, audits and other sources that informed the Manual.

DISCUSSION

Purpose and scope of the Manual

The Manual is the Board's central governance reference. It brings together the Board's governance responsibilities, rules and procedures, protocols, standards of practice, role charters and committee terms of reference, combining legislative requirements and supporting administrative practices into a single practical resource.

The Manual explains:

- what the Board is responsible for;
- the legislative or governance authority for those responsibilities;
- how the Board carries out its responsibilities at the governance level;
- how the Board structures its work and decision-making; and
- how the Board exercises oversight without directing police operations.

The Manual is written in plain language. It is intended to support Board members and Board Office staff, and to help the Chief, the Service, municipal partners and members of the public understand how the Board carries out its governance responsibilities.

Why the Manual matters

The Manual is not unique because of its content, but because of how the content is organized and its scope. Its requirements and principles are grounded in the CSPA, its regulations and other legislation, and in established governance practices across the sector. What makes the Manual distinct is that it brings every responsibility of the Board and its members together in one place. Before this Manual, these responsibilities were spread across legislation, regulations, Inspectorate guidance, Board policies, past practice and training materials.

Combining these responsibilities in one document shows the significant expectations on police service boards. The Board is responsible for ensuring adequate and effective policing, setting policy, approving a strategic plan, overseeing budgets, recruiting and monitoring the Chief's performance, collective bargaining, and holding its own members to standards of conduct, among many other duties.

The scale of these responsibilities shows why boards must be properly supported to carry out their functions. Effective oversight depends on dedicated governance staff, ongoing training, clear processes and access to independent advice. The Manual makes these needs visible and provides a basis for planning the support the Board requires.

In this way, the Manual is part of the broader professionalization and modernization of police oversight that the CSPA was intended to advance. It moves the Board from informal, practice-based governance to a documented, transparent framework that can be consistently applied, reviewed and improved over time.

Rules and procedures of the Board

Approval will establish the Manual as the Board's rules and procedures under s. 46(1) of the CSPA. The Manual sets out how the Board carries out its oversight duties and organizes its governance work.

The Manual is separate from Board Policies under s. 38 of the CSPA, which give policy direction to the London Police Service through the Chief. The Manual does **not** give operational direction to the Chief or the Service. Where it refers to the Chief or the Service, it explains the Board's governance responsibilities, oversight role, information requirements and accountability relationship.

To avoid confusion between the Board's rules and procedures under s. 46 and its policy direction to the Service under s. 38, the documents in the Manual are called Governance Protocols, Standards of Practice, Charters and Terms of Reference rather than policies.

Board Meeting Procedures By-law

This report recommends that the Chief Governance Officer bring forward a Board Meeting Procedures By-law for the Board's review and approval at a future meeting. Once enacted, it will set the formal rules for how meetings of the Board and its committees are called, conducted and recorded. The Board Meeting Governance protocol in the Manual explains how the Board applies the By-law in practice.

Section 46(1) of the CSPA requires the Board, subject to any regulations made by the Minister, to set its own rules and procedures for carrying out its duties.

The CSPA does not say what form these rules must take, and s. 46(2) confirms that Part III of the Legislation Act, 2006 (which governs regulations) does not apply. Police service boards are also not required to pass a procedure by-law under s. 238 of the Municipal Act, 2001. Even so, many Ontario boards, including Toronto, Hamilton and Niagara, set their meeting rules by by-law.

A by-law is the appropriate instrument for the Board's meeting procedures for the following reasons:

- **Validity of Board decisions:** Meeting rules govern notice, quorum, motions, voting and when a meeting may be closed under s. 44 of the CSPA. Clear, binding rules reduce the risk that a Board decision is challenged on procedural grounds.
- **Fairness and public participation:** The By-law applies equally to the Chair, Board members, staff, delegations and members of the public. It gives the Chair clear authority to manage delegations, written correspondence and conduct at meetings in a consistent and accessible way.

- **Stability and transparency:** Because the By-law can only be changed by the Board at a meeting, the rules cannot shift informally from meeting to meeting. The public can see the rules that govern how the Board conducts its business.
- **The policing context:** The Board regularly deals with confidential labour relations, legal and security matters alongside matters of significant public interest. Clear, formal rules for closed sessions, public participation and decision-making help the Board protect confidential information while remaining open and accountable.

The By-law and the Manual are designed to work together.

The By-law sets the binding meeting rules, while Board Governance Protocol *B-007-Board Meeting Governance* provides context, explains how those rules are applied, and connects them to the Board's broader governance framework.

Application and progressive implementation

The Manual brings together provisions that operate at different levels and stages of implementation:

- **Legislative and regulatory requirements:** These apply immediately as required by law. The Manual does not change, delay or replace these requirements.
- **Board rules, procedures and standards:** These can be put into practice immediately and will take effect when the Manual is approved. These include requirements for Board-member conduct, conflicts of interest, confidentiality, expenses and travel, delegated authority and administrative practices.
- **Governance practices that require further time:** Some will require additional procedures, work planning, reporting, training, staff capacity or further development before they can be fully implemented.

Approving the Manual does not delay any existing legal requirement, nor does it mean that every supporting governance practice is already fully in place. The Board will advance those practices through governance work planning, committees, the budget process and regular reporting.

Present-tense drafting

The Manual is written mainly in active, present-tense language. This reflects its purpose as a working governance and instructional reference that describes the Board's framework and practices, rather than a set of policy directives to the Service.

Mandatory language, including "shall," is used only for legislative requirements and specific procedural obligations. Other present-tense wording describes the governance framework the Board uses and will continue to implement. It does not mean every supporting practice was fully in place when the Manual was approved.

Updates and Amendments

The Manual is a living document that will be updated as legislation, regulations, oversight expectations, Board practices and recognized governance standards change.

It is recommended to authorize the Chief Governance Officer to make routine administrative changes, such as corrections to spelling, grammar, formatting, numbering, cross-references, hyperlinks, document titles and statutory citations. This authority also covers changes needed to reflect updates to legislation or regulations, provided they do not affect the Board's governance direction, responsibilities, standards or decision-making authority.

Changes that affect the Board's responsibilities, decision-making authority, governance commitments, standards or obligations are substantive and will be brought to the full Board for approval.

Once approved, the Manual and any future updates will be posted on the Board's website alongside Board Policies and By-laws.

Development and source framework

The Manual reflects a broad range of legislative, regulatory, governance and accountability sources. Appendix B summarizes the principal sources, including:

- Primary legislation and regulations.
- Provincial government and Inspectorate of Policing materials.
- Police Governance Ontario and Canadian Association of Police Governance resources.
- Comparator police service board governance materials.
- Existing London Police Service Board practices and records.
- Public-sector audits and accountability reports.
- Police-governance research and training materials.
- Meeting and procedural resources.
- Legal, governance and peer review.

Appendix A is provided for background. The applicable legislation and the specific legal references in the Manual remain the governing authorities.

CONCLUSION

Approving the Manual will establish the Board's rules and procedures under s. 46(1) of the CSPA and give the Board, its partners and the public a single, clear reference for every responsibility the Board holds. Bringing forward a Board Meeting Procedures By-law will add clear, binding and publicly available rules for how Board meetings are conducted.

Some requirements will apply immediately, while other governance practices will be implemented over time. As a living document, the Manual will be updated as legislation, oversight expectations and Board practices evolve, and it will continue to support the professionalization and modernization of police oversight in London.

APPENDICES

The Manual (DRAFT) has been provided to Board members via email and in printed versions

Appendix A: Principal sources for the development of the Manual

***Alternative formats, translation, and communication supports for this report are available on request.**

APPENDIX B:

Sources for the development of the Manual

1. Legislation, regulations and statutory guidance

The Manual was developed through detailed review of the *Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019*, its regulations and related statutory requirements. Supporting government and oversight sources included:

- Inspector General of Policing annual reports.
- Inspectorate of Policing website information, memoranda, directives, advisory materials and inspection findings.
- Input and guidance from Inspectorate policy advisors.
- The Solicitor General's municipal training aid on the roles and responsibilities of police service board members.

2. Police governance materials and comparator practices

The development process included a comparative review of governance policies, manuals, by-laws, protocols and practices from the Ottawa, Halton, Peel, York, Niagara, Toronto, Durham, Edmonton, Calgary, Surrey and Vancouver police boards/commissions, as well as a governance manual previously co-developed by the Chief Governance Officer while serving as Executive Director of the Vancouver Police Board.

Existing London Police Service Board practices and procedures were also reviewed. Comparative Ontario materials were considered in relation to Board and committee structures, Chair and Vice-Chair responsibilities, meeting procedures, Board-member conduct, collective bargaining, delegated authority, reporting and oversight.

Comparator material was adapted and rewritten as needed to reflect the CSPA, the London context, and the Manual's governance-level purpose, style, tone, and structure.

3. Sector resources and professional learning

Sector resources included Police Governance Ontario materials; Canadian Association of Police Governance training and conference materials; conference presentations, slides, workshop materials, and session notes.

4. Audits, reviews and research

The Manual was informed by legal review, public-sector audit, accountability, oversight and research materials, including:

- The Morden Report and its findings and recommendations on civilian police governance and oversight.
- *The Governance Gap*, research on the capacity and training of police service boards in Canada, together with related governance training materials provided by researcher Tarah Hodgkinson.
- Two City of Vancouver audits of the Vancouver Police Board concerning enterprise risk management and organizational performance management.
- Publicly available governance information, reports, policies and guidance.
- Relevant audit, accountability and oversight findings from other jurisdictions.
- Key provisions with significant legal or legislative implications were subject to external legal review.

5. Meeting and procedural resources

Meeting and decision-making provisions drew on existing London meeting procedures, procedures used by other police boards, Ontario Ombudsman guidance on public meetings, *Robert's Rules of Order* and relevant legal advice.